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ABSOLUTISM, RELATIVISM, AND ANARCHY: 
ALAIN LOCKE AND WILLIAM JAMES ON VALUE 
PLURALISM 
 
§1. INTRODUCTION 
 
It would not be an exaggeration to say that pluralism was central to the 
philosophical thought of William James. Repeatedly, James claimed that 
the ȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȃȱȄȱȱ
philosophy (1910, SPP: 61).1 Radical empiricism, his own metaphysical 
vision, was first introduced as the view that pluralism could be a 
permanent form of the universe (James, 1896, WTB: 6), and this pluralism 
continued to be a central feature of his view in later years (James 1909, PU: 
20). 
 
The assertion that pluralism was a valid philosophical hypothesis was not 
merely theoretical, but practical. James often connected pluralism with 
democ¢ǰȱ ȱ ȱ  ȱ ȃȄȱ ǻǰȱ ŗŞŞŘǰȱ Ǳȱ ŘŖŘǼǯȱ
Whereas monisms Ȯ in any field Ȯ asserted that everything must be unified 
in one substance, or in one intellectual system, pluralism was content with 
a world of interconnected powers, with no one power completely 
dominant over the others (James, 1909, PU: 145). This is the key to James's 
ȱȱȱȱȱȃ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ ȱ ¢Ȅȱ ǻǰȱ ŗşŖś-6, ML: 367). 2  Pluralism was a way of 
viewing the world democratically. According to James, it was the monist 
tendency to assert one ideal as absolute, at the expense of all others, which 
 ȱ ȱ ȃȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȅȱ ǻǰȱ ŗŞşşǰȱ Ǳȱ
151). And, vice versa, it was the attitude which allowed us to see other 
ȇȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȃȱ
ȱȱȱȱǰȱǰȱȱȱȄȱǻǰȱŗŞşşǰȱǱȱ
150). As such, the rejection of monism, dogmatism and absolutism, and 
the adoption of a more reasonable and fallibilistic pluralism, was meant to 
be a large step in the direction of a more tolerant world. 
 
James spent his career combating monism and absolutism within 
philosophy, and it is a testament to his efforts that pluralism looked like a 
reasonable position to the thinkers who followed him. One such thinker 
was Alain Locke. Locke was writing at a time when pluralism was not 
merely a potential philosophical position, but a necessary political one. 
Multiculturalism was struggling to emerge within his own society, and 
totalitarianism was flourishing outside of it. For Locke, then, it was not 
merely enough to deny the philosophical validity of absolutism, as he took 
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James to do. One must also present a positive and functional pluralistic 
axiology. 
 
Like James, Locke saw the tendency in human nature to assert one value 
or system of values as absolute as the root of most evils in the world. In 
both theory and practice, such absolutism inevitably leads to conflict: 
 
ȱ ǽǳǾȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ of reason or that of action, whether 
'above the battle' in the conflict of 'isms' and the 'bloodless ballet of 
ideas' or in the battle for partisans with their conflicting and 
irreconcilable ways of life, the same essential strife goes on in the 
name of eternal ends and deified ultimates' (Locke, 1930: 35).3 
 
Locke, also like James, connected his pluralism with democracy, arguing 
ȱ ȱ  ȱ ȱ ȃȱ Ȅȱ  ȱ ȱ  ȱ ǻǰȱ ŗşŚŘǱȱ śřǼǯȱ
Concerning the practical results of pluralism, and the pernicious effects of 
absolutism, James and Locke are very similar in project and vision. 
 
Locke, however, was much clearer on what a pluralist view needed to 
consist in, if it were to be successful. A pluralist view must be positioned 
between two negative extremes: absolutism on one side, and what he 
ȱ ȃȄȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ  ȱ ȱ
example of the latter. 4  Locke's observation was that the pluralistic 
philosophies which had proceeded him: 
 
avoided [the] normative aspects, which has led them into a 
bloodless behaviourism as arid as the intellectualism they have 
abandoned or else resulted in a completely individualistic and 
anarchistic relativism which has rightly been characterised as 
ȃȱȄȱǻǰȱŗşřŖǱȱřŚǼǯ 
 
In reaction to such philosophies, Locke saw himself as attempting to 
present an account of value which avoided both absolutism on the one 
side, and either positivism or anarchistic relativism on the other. His own 
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃ¢ȱ Ȅǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
anarchistic relativism of James (Locke, 1942: 55).5 
 
The positive account of value Locke aimed to give provided enough space 
for different values to be tolerated, rather than being seen as necessarily in 
conflict (the rejection of absolutism), whilst at the same time allowing 
them to be normatively motivating and to come into meaningful contact 
and communication with each other (the rejection of individualism or 
anarchistic relativism). Here is Locke presenting this central project clearly 
and forcefully: 
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To my thinking, the gravest problem of contemporary philosophy is 
how to ground some normative principle or criterion of objective 
validity for values without resort to dogmatism and absolutism on 
the intellectual plane, and without falling into their corollaries, on 
the plane of social behaviour and action, of intolerance and mass 
coercion (Locke, 1930: 36). 
 
From this broad project, we can delineate three separate problems which 
concerned Locke in the formation of his pluralistic axiology. The first is 
providing an account which enables values to be normative, without 
linking them to some universal or absolute principle or set of principles. 
We can call this the normativity project. The second is providing an account 
with enough objectivity so that meaningful comparisons could be made 
across value systems and different cultures. Call this the objectivity project. 
The third is providing an account which allows us to whole-heartedly 
maintain our own values as important and motivating, whilst at the same 
time being tolerant about other people's values. Locke refers to this as 
value-loyalty (Locke, 1944: 70), so we shall call this the loyalty project. 
 
The paper will examine each of these projects in turn, and see how the 
different pluralisms of James and Locke aim to meet them. My overall 
argument will be that Locke was hasty in calling James a value anarchist, 
and that Locke's approach to pluralism should be supplemented with a 
kind of Jamesian realism if it is to successfully meet these three projects. 
 
§2. NORMATIVITY 
 
The first challenge in developing a pluralistic account of value is 
providing an account of normativity. Any anti-absolutist account must 
abandon the idea that there are absolute, universal values. However, in so 
ȃȱ ȱ Ȅǰȱ  ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ
ǰȱǰȱȱǰȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȄȱǻȱŗşřŖǱȱřŚǼǯȱȱh we 
might reject the absolute nature of certain values, we cannot reject their 
ȃȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ Ȅȱ ǻȱ ŗşřŖǱȱ řśǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ǰȱ ǰȱ
that Locke is most anxious to keep. 
 
Locke is contrasting his approach with one in which values are seen as the 
result of rational judgements, or evaluations in which we apply logical 
predicates. On these kinds of accounts, we apply certain universal 
categories, values, or logical prȱ ȱ ȱ ȃȱ 	Ȅȱ ȱ ȃȱ
Ȅȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ  ȱ ȱ
categorical imperatives of action. In the attempt to abandon the absolutism 
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whilst maintaining the normativity of such a picture, Locke inverts it. 
Instead of appealing to logic, Locke appeals to phenomenology and 
¢¢ǯȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȃȱȱ
ȱ ȱ Ȅȱ ǻǰȱ ŗşřŖǱȱ řŞǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
terms of the application of logical predicates to our experience, we should 
think of it in terms of an experience of valuing which only subsequently 
can be articulated in terms of a logical predicate. 
 
These [value- or feeling-] modes co-assert their own relevant norms; 
each sets up a categorical imperative of its own, not of the Kantian 
sort with rationalized universality and objectivity, but instead the 
psychological urgency (shall we say, necessity?) to construe the 
situation as of a particular qualitative form-character. It is this that 
we term a function categorical factor, since it operates in and 
through feeling, although it is later made explicit, analysed, and 
validated by evaluative processes of judgement and experiential 
test (Locke, 1930: 41). 
 
Experiences of valuing bring their own normativity. So instead of making 
the normativity of particular instances of valuing dependent on logical 
categories, Locke makes the normativity of these logical categories 
dependent on experiences of valuing. 
 
We need to say more about how valuing experiences come to have 
normativity outside of explicit evaluation. Locke's assertion is that though 
we later come to rationalise our experience in terms of predicates, values 
ȱ ȱ ȃ¢ǰȱ ǰȱ ȱ ǻȱ ȱ ȱ Ǽȱ ǽǾȱ
righteousness are known in immediate recognitions of qualitative 
ȄȱǻȱŗşřŖǱȱřşǼǯȱȱȱ ȱȱȱǰȱ
and only subsequently logical. But these qualitative values are not without 
¢ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȇȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃctly 
ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ǰȱ  ȱ ǽǳǾȱ ȱ ȱ
¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡Ȅȱ ǻȱ ŗşřŖǱȱ řŞǼǯȱȱ ȱ ǰȱ
through valuing, a mood or an emotionally charged kind of experience. In 
ȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȃȱȱ ȱȄȱǻǰȱŗşřŖǱȱ
řşǼȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȃȱ ȱȱ
ȱȄȱǻǰȱŗşřŖǱȱřŜǼǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
actions appear wrong, given the mood of the experience. Accordingly, 
thȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃ¢ȱ Ȅȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃȱ
ȱ ȱ ¡Ȅǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃ¢ȱ ȱ
¡ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȄȱǻǰȱŗşřŖǱȱřşǼǯ 
 
We see here that Locke appeals to types or modes of feeling and valuing. 
ȱȱȱǰȱȇȱȱȱȱȱȱȃȱ
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and fundamental feeling-Ȅȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
and cultures (Locke 1930: 39). There are common types of feeling, which 
give rise to common types of experience, and common types of value. An 
appeal to common-sense tells Locke that the moral, the aesthetic, the 
logical, and the religious are the most common categories of value. As 
these different categories of value must first be identified at the qualitative 
ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃ-Ȅǯȱ ȱ
instance, it is the feeling-mode of exaltation which brings religious 
experiences, this feeling of exultation itself setting up a mode of 
experience in which we feel that there are normative imperatives to 
perform, or refrain from performing, certain actions or interpretations. In 
the same way, the feeling of tension grounds our ethical experiences, the 
feeling of acceptance grounds logical value; and the feeling of repose 
grounds aesthetic value (Locke, 1930: 43). Locke's complete picture of 
normativity, then, is that there are certain common feelings or valuations, 
which give rise to moods or types of experience, which carry with them a 
certain normative force to interpret the situation in certain ways and 
behave in certain ways, and that this is what subsequently, in intellectual 
analysis, comes to be expressed in the language of logical predicates such 
ȱȃȱ
¢Ȅǰȱȃȱ	ȄǰȱȱȃȱȄȱǻǰȱŗşřŖǱȱ43). 
 
Locke maintains a strict anti-realism throughout his account of value, as 
he associates the realist claim that our values are true of something outside 
of our attitudes with absolutism.6 The realist's attempt to discover the 
ȃȄȱȱȱȱct is taken to be a sign of a particular fallacy: 
 
[f]rom the functionalist's point of view the basic error lies in 
regarding the formal value as the cause of the valuation or as an 
essence of the value object rather than the system value of the mode 
of valuing' (Locke, 1945: 86).7 
 
Valuing an object only makes sense within the context of a felt experience 
with a certain emotional mood. The attempt to take the object outside of 
this context to discover whether or not it is really valuable is the realist's 
ǯȱȇȱȃȄȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
valuable within the context of the experience this is claimed in, and 
analyses the roles such claims play and the behaviours which they make 
appropriate. It is not interpreted as a claim about the properties of the 
object. As such, the relativism of Locke does not foster conflict between 
different value systems, in the way absolutism does. If you are interpreting 
an object as beautiful, and I am interpreting it as good or morally 
compelling in some way, we are not in conflict. We are merely operating 
under different value-modes or -systems, neither of which are more 
correct or accurate accounts of reality. Arguments over which value 
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represents the summum bonum ȱ ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
opposition because their basic value attitudes are psychologically 
ȄȱǻȱŗşřŖǱȱŚśǼǯ 
 
One of the strengths of Locke's vision is its ability to account for what 
ȱȱȃ-Ȅǯȱ-valuations are times when we switch 
between value-modes whilst valuing the same object. Examples include 
when we appreciate an intellectual formula as beautiful rather than true or 
correct (Locke 1930: 44), or when an artist comes to see the work he is 
working on as an act of duty rather than an act of creative activity (Locke, 
1930: 41). In these cases the feeling with which we are engaging with the 
object changes, and our categorisation of the value of that object changes 
accordingly. The absolutist must explain away these cases as illusionary, or 
merely metaphorical. For Locke these trans-valuations are a real and 
normal part of our lives. 
 
Examples of trans-valuation do three things. First, the fact that changes in 
our feeling towards an object changes the categorisation of the value we 
place on it seems to provide support for Locke's assertion that the affective 
is prior to the evaluative. 'Once a different form-feeling is evoked', Locke 
tells us, 'the situation and the value type are, ipso facto, changed. Change 
the attitude, and, irrespective of content, you change the value type; the 
appropriate new predicates automatically follow' (Locke, 1930: 44). 8 
Second, this is meant to be an instance in which Locke's systematic 
relativism can account for a feature of moral experience which the 
absolutist cannot. Whereas the absolutist must explain away such cases, 
ȇȱ¢ȱȃ¢ǽǾȱȱȱȱȱ¡ȄȱǻȱŗşřŖǱȱ
44). Thirdly, these trans-valuations are meant to provide us with an 
analogy for how we can react to other people's values with tolerance. If we 
find that within our own experience apparently opposed values are 
harmonised, and merge into each other, then this may lead us to think the 
same about differing values between persons. When we realise that 
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡Ȅǰȱ
we stop thinking that only one value can be the correct one (Locke, 1930: 
47). 
 
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃȱ Ȅǰȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
ǰȱȃ¢ȱ Ȅȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱ
 ȱȱȱǯȱȱȱ ȱȱȃȱȄȱȱ ȱ
looking for (Locke, 1930: 38). Though Locke is right that James does not 
explicitly forward an account of normativity, we'll see in the final section 
(§4) that he does have some response to the claim that his brand of 
ȱȱȃȄǯ 
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It is worth noting at this stage that James should in principle be on board 
 ȱȇȱȃȱ¢ȱȱȄȱǻǰȱŗşřŖǱȱŚśǼǯȱȇs bold 
and original move is to attempt to provide an account of normativity 
without appealing to anything outside of affective experience. As such, the 
Jamesian can recognise in Locke a kind of radical empiricist approach to 
normativity.9 
 
There are, however, some concerns we might raise about Locke's account. 
Locke's account of normativity is based on the idea that certain types of 
feelings come with imperatives to interpret and act in certain ways. What 
Locke does not supply is an account of why we ought to feel certain ways 
in certain situations. Why is it appropriate to feel exultation in certain 
situations, and not in others? When my next door neighbour demonstrates 
a sense of exultation and holy awe in response to his new garden fence, do 
I have grounds for criticising what appears to be his misplaced feeling? 
Can the relativist have anything to say to someone who feels no tension in 
what is, to others, a situation that requires moral interpretation? These are 
not original claims to level at the relativist, but it seems that these are this 
kinds of concerns Locke's systematic relativism are meant to avoid. Locke 
can provide normativity in the sense of having shared modes of valuation 
which have imperative norms of action and interpretation attached. But 
there is no normativity concerning which situations require certain felt 
responses.10 
 
Locke cannot appeal to objective features of the environment to provide 
this normativity. We've seen that Locke equates any form of moral realism 
with absolutism. Our values are relational in nature, in that they are 
ȱ  ȱ ȱ ȱ  ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃ¢ȱ
ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡Ȅȱ ǻǰȱ ŗşřŖǱȱ řŞ-39). 11  But the claim by 
ȱȱȱȱȃȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱrtain 
ȱǰȱȱ ȱȱ Ȅȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ
objective pole of this relation which determine the appropriateness or 
inappropriateness of a particular attitude (Locke, 1935: 46). Locke asserts 
that though valuation always has some content, that content never 
ȱ ȱȱȱǱȱȃ-quality, irrespective of content, 
makes ȱȱȱȱȱȄȱǻǰȱŗşřŖǱȱŚŖǰȱȱǼǯ 
 
This anti-realism doesn't follow straight-forwardly from Locke's project. 
Later, I will suggest that James's account can provide a kind of realism 
which Locke's lacks, without returning to absolutism. We can suggest that 
our feelings are responsive to certain objective elements of a situation, 
without suggesting that only one value-mode is an  appropriate response. 
This pluralistic realism would not be at odds with Locke's larger project. 
Locke's refusal to accept any form of realism into his affective theory leads 
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to a certain lack in his account of normativity. 
 
 
§3. OBJECTIVITY 
 
 
The second challenge to providing a pluralistic account of value is 
objectivity. If we are going to have meaningful discourse about values 
between different people and different cultures, then we must have 
something objective on which to ground such interactions. Locke wants to 
provide an account in which value is grounded on something more 
objective than subjective opinion (the value anarchist position), but less 
objective than universal values to which all of humanity should be held 
accountable (the absolutist position). Locke has already rejected any kind 
of moral realism as a basis for objectivity, and so he must look elsewhere 
ȱ ȱ  ǯȱ 
ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ  ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃȱ
ȄȱǻǰȱŗşŚŘǱȱśśǼǯ12 
 
Locke's basic strategy iȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
Ȅǰȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱǻǰȱŗşŚŚǱȱ
73). We have already seen this at work in Locke's appeal to common 
feeling types which ground our different ways of valuing. Though we may 
have several different instances of a type of value, these different 
valuations are all connected by virtue of a common feeling which brings 
about a qualitative universal and set of norms. These valuations may have 
different objects, but they have common attitudes, and thus norms, by 
which we can assess them. 
 
A good example is Locke's approach to modern art. Many traditionalists 
rejected modern art as art, because they were wedded to a particular idea 
ȱ ȃ¢Ȅǯȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ  ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ articular 
properties of certain objects, and modern art did not accord with this 
notion. Locke's interpretation of modern art, by comparison, sees 
modernism as making progress over the traditional approaches. The 
modernist has enlarged the scope of our artistic norms to include objects 
which were not previously included (Locke, 1945: 90). Though these 
ȱȱǰȱȱȃȱȱȄȱȱȱǰȱȱ
so we can recognise the modern art as being part of the same value system 
as the more traditional pieces. If we judge the different art styles by a fixed 
absolute such as a particular vision of beauty, then they appear to be 
divergent activities, at odds with one another. However, if we consider 
these different styles to have a broad functional commonality, allowing 
our contemplative feeling-attitudes to express themselves, for instance, 
then we can recognise both the traditional and the modernist approaches 
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as fulfilling this role in different, but comparable ways. Locke contends 
thaȱȱȃ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
accompanied by a deepening of aesthetic taste and a sharpening of critical 
Ȅȱ ǻǰȱŗşŚśǱȱşŖ). We can see the modernist approach as 
an adaptation and refinement of a kind of activity which the traditionalist 
was also engaged in. 
 
At a cultural level, Locke's claim is the same. Though the content of what 
different cultural groups value may differ, these different values provide 
the same functional role. This notion is whȱ ȱ ȱ ȃȱ
ȄȱǻǰȱŗşŚŚǱȱŝřǼǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
corollaries of applying his systematic relativism on the cultural level. The 
other two are the reciprocity of different values, the claim that we can reject 
ȱȱ¢ȱȇȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱȃǰȱ-
by-ȱȄȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱǲȱ
and limited cultural convertibility, or the view that because there are shared 
functional attitudes between cultures, cultural transference can take place, 
but should be limited by certain sociological factors (Locke, 1944: 73).13 
 
Locke's pluralistic vision is meant to have very practical results for 
democracy: 
 
[I]t puts the premium upon equivalence not upon identity, calls for 
co-operation rather than for conformity and promotes reciprocity 
instead of factional antagonism. Authoritarianism, dogmatism, and 
bigotry just cannot take root and grow in such intellectual soil' 
(Locke, 1942: 60). 
 
Though both the relativist and the absolutist are aiming for peace within 
the political sphere, the absolutist confuses uniformity for unity. Uniformity 
is identity in form or content, whereas unity on the relativist picture can 
be achieved by the recognition of common functions or purposes, though 
perhaps clothed very differently (Locke, 1942: 53). The absolutist, because 
of their association of unity with uniformity, must pursue unity via 
¡¢ǰȱ ȱȃȱȱ¢ȱȱȄȱ
(Locke, 1944: 70). As such absolutism leads to dogmatism, struggle, and 
the very conflict which it aims to avoid. Relativism, on the other hand, 
 
with no arbitrary specifications of unity, no imperious demand for 
universality, nevertheless enjoins a beneficent neutrality between 
divergent positions, and, in the case of the contacts of cultures, 
would in due course promote, step by step, from an initial stage of 
cultural tolerance, mutual respect, reciprocal exchange, some 
specific communities of agreement and, finally, with sufficient 
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mutual understanding and confidence, commonality of purpose 
and action' (Locke, 1944: 70-71). 
 
 As Harris tells us, Locke's claim is that '[t]he unity of peoples can exist 
without uniformity of cultural modalities' (Harris, 1989: 68).14 
 
So, in summary, Locke believes that his systematic relativism provides us 
with the capacity for objective analysis between different valuers and 
cultures. Though different cultures might value different things, these 
values are underpinned by a common type of feeling, and common 
functional roles. Though what we find beautiful might differ, our feeling 
of beauty, the inchoate norms that emerge from this feeling, and the 
functions of the practices based on this feeling are all essentially similar. 
We might worship different Gods, but what it means to worship, and the 
kind of role it plays in our lives, are commonalities which unify us. It is 
ȇȱȱȱȱȱȱȃȱȱȄȱ
ȱ ȱ ȃȱ ȱ Ȅȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
analysing different values according to one standard, and is more likely to 
lead to cross-cultural discussion and cooperation than absolutism. And it 
is this objectivity which he accuses the anarchic relativist of lacking. 
 
We might not think that the attribution of anarchic relativism to James is 
unfair, considering some portions of his work. For instance, in his explicit 
work on ethics, James makes the seemingly individualistic claim that the 
good is nothing but the satisfaction of demand, and that each demand 
prima facie deserves to be met. In fact, James is insistent that nothing 
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱ ȃȄȱ ȱ ȇȱ ¢Ǽǯ15 
However, a closer look at James's work as a whole reveals that the attempt 
to uncover fundamental affective and functional similarities when 
assessing very divergent positions is a staple of James's pragmatism. I'll 
address two such attempts here: James's approach to philosophy as a 
whole, and James's approach to religion. 
 
Throughout his career, but most forcefully in A Pluralistic Universe (1909), 
James argues that one of the central goals of philosophy is to provide us 
 ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȃȱȄȱȱǯȱ
ȱ
¡ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȃ¢Ȅǰȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ
ȃȱȄȱȱȱ ¢ȱ ȱȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ
we should assess different metaphysical visions. On this view, then, 
though metaphysical visions appear to assert any number of contradictory 
things, they have a shared purpose which allows these different 
philosophies to enter into conversation, and be assessed by the same 
criteria (James, 1909, PU: 11). Over the course of the work, James argues 
that his own pluralistic account meets this affective and functional 
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criterion of intimacy better than monism. This is not the time to present 
this argument in detail, but what it tells us is that James accepts something 
very similar to Locke's approach of finding objectivity in underlying 
ȃȱ Ȅȱ  ȱ ȱ  ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
common objects.16 
 
A second example can be found in James's work on religion. In The 
Varieties of Religious Experience, and elsewhere, James analyses the various 
claims of very different religious beliefs, and finds common functional 
aims behind them. In Varieties this is stated as: 
 
the practical needs and experiences of religion seem to me 
sufficiently met by the belief that beyond each man and in a fashion 
continuous with him there exists a larger power which is friendly to 
him and his ideals (James, 1902, VRE: 413). 
 
We can find similar statements of the broad functional aim of religion 
elsewhere in James work.17 This might seem like a very weak sense of 
religion, but James is not offering us a definitive account of religious belief. 
Instead, his is suggesting that there is a common function which every 
religious account is attempting to meet, and by which we can assess the 
different religious hypotheses. James, like Locke, does not want this 
ȃȱȄȱȱȱǯȱȱȱǰȱȱǰȱ
such questions as to whether the best religious hypothesis is monotheistic 
or polytheistic, whether God is infinite or finite, and whether human 
immortality is possible (James, 1902, VRE: 412-3). James asserts that a 
ȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱ	ȱȱǰȱȱȃȱ¢ȱ¢ȱ
 ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȅȱ ǻǰȱ
1902, VRE: 411), but this remains a fallible hypothesis, rather than a 
dogmatic assertion.18 
 
These two examples show that James can appeal to the same basic account 
of objectivity that Locke can, though James's account is less structured. But 
this is not the only notion of objectivity which James has available to him. 
We can see this in James's explicit engagement with relativism. James does, 
in fact, call himself a relativist, by which he simply means anti-absolutist 
(James, 1909, MT: 142). But he explicitly rejects the notion that any opinion 
is as good as any other, which is what Locke's accusation of anarchic 
ȱȱǯȱȃȄǰȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ
ȱȃȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱ ¢ȱȱ ȱ
ȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȄȱ ǻǰȱŗşŖşǰȱǱȱŗŚśǼǯȱȱ
opinions have been tested, and will continue to be tested, against 
experience, and we have to trust that experience will help us select which 
opinions are true (ibid). 19  Over time, we make progress towards true 
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beliefs. And we have no reason to suspect that our beliefs within the 
ethical or aesthetic sphere are any different.20 James's relativism, then, does 
not deny absolute truth: 
 
No relativist who ever actually walked the earth has denied the 
regulative character in his own thinking of the notion of absolute 
truth. What is challenged by the relativists is the pretence on 
anyone's part to have found for certain at any given moment what 
ȱȱȱȱȱȄȱǻǰȱŗşŖşǰȱǱȱŗŚřǼǯ 
 
The primary difference between absolutism and James's relativism, then, 
is not that one believes in absolute truth and the other does not. The 
difference is that for the Jamesian relativist absolute truth is what will be 
coercive over experience in the long run of human inquiry (James, 1909, 
MT: 143). 
 
So it seems as if James has access to two sources of objectivity in his 
account of value pluralism. He shares with Locke a functionalism, an 
appeal to affective and functional constants which underpin different 
values. But he also appeals to a kind of realism, which sees our values as 
responsive in the long run to features of experience, so that we move 
closer to truth.  We can find this second element of objectivity in the 
examples we've already looked at. In James's metaphysics, each account is 
treated as a hypotheses whose objectivity is measured by assessing how 
well they fulfil their functional roles and how well the continued drift of 
experience continues to confirm them.21 In the case of religion, James tells 
us to treat our different religious beliefs as hypotheses, which experience 
will confirm or deny in the long run (James, 1896: WB: 9). James' approach 
in these cases is to combine functional analysis, which delineates 
commonalities in aims and methods of assessment between apparently 
divergent positions, and a realism by which we test our various 
hypotheses against experience.22 
  
For Locke, this realist approach will be indicative of his second large 
criticism of pragmatism. 23  Though many pragmatists claims to be 
pluralistic, argues Locke, they in fact reduce all claims of truth to what is 
experimentally testable. 24  ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃ-¡Ȅȱ
¢ȱ ǻǰȱ ŗşřŖǱȱ řŝǼǯȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃȱ
cȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ǽǾȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȅȱ ¢ȱ
narrows what we actually mean by truth (ibid). According to Locke, truth 
ȃ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ
way of feeling, the corroboration of a value. To the poet, beauty is truth; to 
the religious devotee, God is truth; to the enthused moralist, what ought-
to-be overtops factual reality' (Locke, 1930: 37). The experimentalist fallacy, 
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on the other hand, is to apply just one account of truth, drawn from the 
natural sciences, to all areas.25 We look for objectivity not in the actual 
ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ
ȱȱȱȄȱǻǰȱŗşřŖǱȱřŞǼǯ 
 
Interestingly, this concern of Locke's is shared in some sense by James. 
James continually suggests that a philosophy should aim to account not 
just for intellectual needs, or scientific validity, but also aesthetic, moral, 
and practical needs.26 Any philosophy that suggests that only questions of 
science or logic are answerable will be seen as deficient on James's account. 
Nonetheless, James sticks to his claim that aesthetic, moral, and practical 
beliefs are tested in experience. And he does so by broadening the notion 
of experience beyond the physical. James's radical empiricism is rooted in 
the claim that everything that is real must be experienceable, and that 
everything experienceable is real (1904, ERE: 22). This includes religious 
experiences and moral experiences. So James has a broad enough notion of 
inquiry, and of experience, to avoid Locke's concerns about the 
experimentalist method. James's experimentalism means nothing more 
than the notion that we should treat our various ideals and beliefs as 
hypotheses to be tested against our experience and that of humanity as a 
whole, and that we should be open to their alteration by contradictory 
experience. This account does not seem to narrow the kinds of things 
which can be seen as real or true in the way which worries Locke. 
 
 
§4. LOYALTY 
 
 
The third challenge for developing a non-ȱȱȱȃ¢¢Ȅǯȱ
Whilst being tolerant of values different from our own, we must also be 
able to find our own personal and cultural values meaningful. First and 
foremost our values are calls to interpretation and action. Any relativism 
which abandons the feeling that our own values are meaningful and 
motivating will essentially lead to nihilism and indifference. This is what 
ȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȃ¢ȱȄȱȱ 
value, leads to (Locke, 1944: 70). Absolutism, on the other hand, maintains 
our own values are meaningful and motivating, but only at the expense of 
dogmatically denying other people's values as worthwhile. Locke's own 
relativism aims for a middle ground: ȃǽǾȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
and counteracts value bigotry without destroying the sense of active value 
¢¢Ȅȱ ǻǰȱ ŗşŚŚǱȱ ŝŖǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
final section. 
 
According to Locke's anti-absolutism we cannot think of our cultural or 
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personal values as superior to others. But Locke does not want us to 
eradicate the loyalty we feel to these values, but to reposition it. Instead of 
ȱȱ ȱȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃȱ ȱ ȱ
¢¢Ȅǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȃȱȱȱ¡£ȱȱ-mode 
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢Ȅȱ ǻǰȱ ŗşřŖǱȱ ŚŞǼǯȱ ȃǽǾȱȱ
¢¢Ȅȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȃ¢ȱȱȄȱ
of our different values, and those underlying functional and affective 
ȱ  ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃȱ ȱ ǽǳǾȱ Ȅȱ
(Locke, 1942: 60). 
 
Certainly, value pluralism of this kind can lead to a perceived loss of 
prestige for our particular culture's values. We lose the notion that our 
value system is the correct value system. But, in exchange, we move 
 ȱ ȱ ȃȱ pax romana of values, with greater and more 
ȱȱȄȱ ǻǰȱŗşŚŘǱȱśŜǼǯȱȱ¢ǰȱȱ
elsewhere tells us that, though this repositioning of our values might be 
ǰȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃȱ ¢ȱ ȱ
¢ȱȱȄȱǻǰȱŗşřŘ-4: 137). 
 
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ  ȱ ȱ ¢ȇȱ ȃ¢¢ȱ ȱ
¢¢Ȅȱǯ27 Like Locke, Royce's solution to an apparent paradox in 
the value of loyalty was to appeal to a common denominator. The paradox 
which concerned Royce consisted in the fact that being loyal to something 
is a supreme human good, but that the conflict which arises between 
different groups who are loyal to different things is the supreme human 
evil (Royce, 1908: 30-31). The common denominator Royce appeals to is 
loyalty itself. Each of us sees that loyalty is a common good, and we 
should reposition our loyalty so that we apprehend the vaȱȱȃȱ
¢¢Ȅȱȱȃ¢¢ȱȱ¢¢Ȅǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢¢ȱȱ
humanity as a whole, and not merely the success of the particular cause 
we are loyal to. We now serve our individual cause with a view to 
ȱȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢¢ȱȱȄȱ ǻ¢ǰȱ
1908: 121). We then seek a good for all humankind, rather than ourselves, 
ȱȱȱȃȱ¢¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȄȱǻ¢ǰȱŗşŖŞǱȱ
129-30).28 
 
Locke's move to reposition our value loyalty, then, is again dependent on 
their being shared common denominators between apparently different 
values. Our aim, if we are truly loyal to a certain value, should be to 
increase understanding, diversity, or expression within a certain type or 
mode of value. To return to our example of art, the modernist is truly loyal 
to the essence of her value, seeing as she wants to increase diversity and 
understanding of aesthetic expression and appreciation. The traditionalist 
is only loyal to a particular symbol of value, a particular notion of Beauty 
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or aesthetic appreciation, and so rejects the progress the modernist 
represents. Similarly, though I am a Hindu and you are a Christian, we 
both express exultation of the divine, and so what we are loyal to is 
essentially the same, even though the external symbols of our respective 
faiths are different. 
 
Conflicts can still occur, for Locke. But they are conflicts within a shared 
context. For instance, Locke considers two conflicting accounts of the atom: 
the classical theory and the modern theory. The two objects occupy the 
same functional role within the same value context, and cannot both be 
correct. However, appealing to the common functional denominator that 
each theory is attempting to fulfil, we can see that the modern theory 
ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȅǰȱ ȱ ȱ  ȱ ȱ
ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȃȄȱǻǰȱŗşŚśǱȱŞşǼǯȱȱȱȱ ¢ǰȱ
we might still discuss whether polytheism or monotheism is the better 
way to worship the divine. This is still a potential disagreement, but one 
with a common denominator both sides agree to and refer to. Recognition 
of a shared essence between the two positions leads to reasonable 
discourse, whereas the assertion that the different symbols of the different 
faiths are true leads to unhelpful conflicts. Moreover, assuming one side is 
ȱ¢ȱ ǰȱ¢ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȃȱȱȱ
ȱȱ¢ȄȱǻǰȱŗşŚśǱȱŞşǼǯ 
 
This is a neat way of solving the problem of value loyalty. However, there 
are two potential problems which emerge when considering Locke's 
position from a Jamesian standpoint. The first concerns Locke's anti-
realism, the second his appeal to common denominators. I'll consider each 
in turn. 
 
Locke is quite insistent that his relativism sees values as existing in 
attitude rather than in reality. The problem with this is that it means the 
Lockean relativist is forced to conclude that whichever value one adopts, it 
can make no meaningful impact upon reality. James's account, on the other 
hand, is that the meaning of a value is dependent on that value's actual or 
potential contribution to reality. Only when we see that there are real 
possibilities which our values are responsive to, and which acting under 
our values can effect, can we see our values as meaningful and motivating 
(James, 1884, WB: 135). Only if we can see ourselves as fighting to bring 
some positive value into reality, can we find our lives meaningful (James, 
1895, WB: 55). And any philosophy which removes external reference for 
ȱȱȃȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȄȱǻǰȱŗŞŞŘǰȱǱȱ
71). 
 
James's view is, simply put, that in order to find our values meaningful 
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and motivating, we must consider them to have some real reference, 
outside of our attitude. The force of our values is only felt when we 
consider that acting under them will bring about some effect. If we do not 
think some change to reality can be brought about, we lose any motivation 
to act. Without the motivation to act, our ideals become merely subjective, 
and at the thought of a world in which our ideals have no real reference, 
 ȱ ȱ ȱ  ȱ ȱ ȃȱ unheimlichkeitȄȱ ǻŗŞŞŘǰȱ Ǳȱ ŝŗǼǯ29 In 
short, then, James would worry that Locke's system, in virtue of its anti-
realism, would lead to the subjectivism and indifferentism that he aims to 
avoid. 
 
Locke's reliance on common denominators presents a second problem. 
Because Locke seeks objectivity in his account of value, but cannot find 
this objectivity in any form of realism, Locke makes the commonalities he 
identifies within our valuing very robust. But the strength of these 
commonalities endangers the difference Locke wants to maintain. 
Apparently different values are either part of the same value mode, or 
they are not. If they are part of the same value mode, then in essence they 
are the same, though they may have different symbols. If they are not part 
of the same value mode, then they are not in conflict at all, but represent 
different but compatible psychological approaches to the same object. The 
latter option removes the possibility of saying one value mode is more 
appropriate than another in a certain context (§2). The former, James 
would say, unfairly reduces differences to commonality. We often find 
Locke suggesting that aȱȱȱȃȄǰ30 or that the 
particular symbols associated by a culture with the common value modes 
ȱȱȱȃ¢ȄȱǻǰȱŗşŚŚǱȱŝŜǼǯ 
 
Seemingly, Locke gains harmony between competing values at the 
expense of the meaning of those different values. Locke may well be 
correct that there are underlying affective and functional constants 
beneath our apparently different value claims. But it remains unclear how 
reorienting our loyalty to these constants maintains the meaning of our 
personal and cultural values, if we simultaneously hold their 
distinctiveness as at best irrelevant and at worst irrational. 
 
So, if we cannot appeal to underlying affective and functional constants, 
how are we to overcome conflicts in value on James account? According to 
James, we do so by seeing ourselves as engaged in a common epistemic 
project of discovering what the right and most inclusive system of goods 
really is (1888-9, ML: 184). When we find two ideals which are in conflict, 
we ask ourselves  ȱ ȃ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȅǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
can only be answered by appeal to our own and other people's experience 
(1891, WB: 158). Ultimately, through the experience of the human race as a 
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whole, we reach some stable views on what is really good and valuable 
(1882, WB: 87). Though Locke might insist that James's turn to realism 
might lead to people dogmatically asserting our own ideals, James insists 
we are meant to hold our values as hypotheses. They are fallible, and 
subject to change in the face of experience. For instance, we may 
experience disappointment at the satisfaction of our values, or find they 
are incompatible with other values, or unachievable, or achievable at too 
great a cost. And we view other people's values as hypotheses along the 
same lines. As such, differences in values are seen as no more problematic 
than differences in scientific hypotheses. It with an appeal to a very broad 
notion of science, then, that James aims to avoid the dogmatism which 
Locke assumes goes along with realism. 
 
This allows us to return to the promissory note regarding James's 
approach to normativity (§2). Though James does not explicitly talk about 
normativity, he does talk about what it is to find our ideals and values 
motivating. Locke himself takes motivation to be the primary notion of 
normativity. James holds that in order for our values to be motivating, we 
must consider them to be actual or potential contributions to reality. James 
gives us reasons to act under our various ideals, and avoids the nihilism 
and indifferentism which Locke is concerned to avoid. But James also 
provides us with a second account of normativity. According to James, our 
ideals and values are hypotheses about the world, and are amenable to 
experience. We can be right or wrong in our assertions that certain courses 
of action, or the adoption of certain practices, are valuable.31 Moreover, 
seeing as the world is altered by our actions and the ideals we act under, 
we have a responsibility to make our values the right ones. We need to be 
aware of the consequences of acting under them, we need to be responsive 
to the experiences which tell us whether they are valuable in the right 
ways, and we need to allow other people to express equally plausible 
hypotheses about the good. 
 
 
§5. CONCLUSION 
 
 
Locke offers any account of value pluralism three challenges. For 
pluralism not to be mere anarchic relativism, we must provide an 
adequate account of normativity, objectivity, and loyalty, whilst avoiding 
absolutism. We've looked at two attempts to do so: Locke's own systematic 
relativism, and James's pluralism. Despite Locke's claim that James 
represents an anarchic relativist position, we've seen a great number of 
similarities between the two, with one major difference: though James is 
happy to appeal to a limited realism, Locke holds that any such appeal 
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leads to dogmatism. 
 
Any Jamesian account has a great deal to learn from Locke's pluralistic 
axiology. Locke effectively articulates what such an axiology requires, and 
the problems which must face it. Locke aims to answer these problems by 
appealing to common affective and functional constants which lie behind 
different claims about value. His appeals to examples of trans-valuation, 
his careful analysis of the pluralistic thesis, and his affective account of 
normativity, are things which a Jamesian account must take seriously. 
However, I have suggested that an attempt to locate normativity solely in 
feeling and attitude limits such a theory. Without reference to something 
outside of feeling, and cultural practices of valuation, we cannot account 
for why certain values apply to certain objects appropriately, and not to 
others. Without our values having some kind of reference to a reality 
outside of them, our values become what James would call ȃȱ ȱ ȱ
ȱ Ȅǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
contributions to reality, and so unable to be found meaningful.32 
 
James's account of value pluralism appeals to some form of realism to 
meet the three challenges Locke has set. I have suggested that we do not 
need to think of this realism in a strong sense, as our values being in the 
world, or of one value being absolutely true. But we do need to think of our 
values as being responsive to a wider reality, outside of feeling. I have 
neither defended nor detailed this limited realism here. But I have 
suggested that any value pluralism which wants to meet the three criteria 
which Locke set out needs to appeal to something like Jamesian realism.33 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1All references to William James are taken from The Works of William James editions. 
References will be in the following convention: (Author, date originally published, book 
abbreviation: page). See bibliography for abbreviations used. 
2ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱǻǯȱŗşşŝǼȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȇȱȃȱ¢Ȅǯȱ
Speaking of Alain Locke, and cultural pluralism more generally, Horace Kallen also 
prevents a social analogy. For Kallen, the difference between monism and pluralism was 
ȱ ȱ  ȱ ȃȄȱ ȱ ȃȄǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
brotherhood of man, but this word carries 'implication of identical beginning and 
common end' (Kallen, 1957: 120). For Kallen, brotherhood is a relationship defined by 
identity at the expense of difference. This relationship says: 'so that you become 
completely a brother, you must offer up your own different being to be digested into 
identification with mine' (ibid). On the other hand, friendship is a relationship defined by 
difference. The friend says 'I am different from you. You are different from me. The basis 
of our communion is our difference. Let us exchange the fruits of our differences so that 
each may enrich the other with what the other is not or has not in himself' (Kallen 1957: 
120-1). 
3All references to Alain Locke's works are taken from Leonard Harris's excellent edited 
collection The Philosophy of Alain Locke: Harlem Renaissance and Beyond (1989). References 
will follow this convention: (Author, date originally written: page). 
4Cf. Locke (1942: 55) for an instance of Locke's attribution to James of value anarchism. 
According to Harris (1989: 32), it is normal for Locke to attribute anarchism to James. 
5Stikkers (1999) provides an account of an additional difference between Locke and James. 
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For James, Stikkers argues, pluralism was intrinsically valuable, something to be 
ȱȱȃȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȄǯȱȱǰȱȱȱȱǰȱ
pluralism was instrumentally ǰȱȱȃȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ
 ȱȱȱ¢ȄȱǻǰȱŗşşşǱȱŘŗřǼǯȱis is not a difference I have time 
to address in this paper. It would be incorrect, I think, to suggest that James was not also 
aware of the instrumental importance of pluralism. But it is quite right to indicate a 
tendency in James to see difference, novelty, and diversity as valuable in itself in a way 
that deserves separate investigation. 
6 (cf. Locke, 1945: 85) 
7 Locke makes this anti-realist claim as far back as his doctoral dissertation, on which 
much of his later work is based: '[M]ost theories of value make, rather than seek to discover, 
a system of value (1918: 7, quoted in Mason 1988: 95, emphasis mine). 
8 cf. (Locke 1945: 84). 
9 Radical empiricism holds that we cannot appeal to anything outside of experience, nor 
ignore anything within experience (James, 1904, ERE: 22). Applied to value theory, we 
ȱ ȱ ȇȱ ȃȱ ¢Ȅȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȇȱ  ȱ
ȃȄȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȃȱȱȱȱȱȱ
ȄȱǻǰȱŗŞşŗǰȱǱȱŗŚŗ-162). 
10 There is a second, more unwieldy, criticism which follows from Locke's claim that 
normativity emerges from immediate sensational experience. As Mason puts it: 'The 
original value sensing is always a direct and immediate experience, and like all direct and 
immediate experiences, it is supposedly noncognitive' (Mason 1988: 93). Locke is either 
committed to a certain kind of non-cognitivism about normativity, or seems to engender 
ȱȃ¢ȱȱȱȄȱ¢ȱǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ
with here. 
11  Comment redacted for anonymous review. See Carter (2012) for a more detailed 
analysis of the relational nature of value in Locke's account. 
12 ȱȃȱȄȱȱȱȱȱǻǰȱŗşŚŚǱȱŝřǼǯ 
13 Exactly what Locke means when he says his relativism is objective is questionable. My 
account here places this objectivity in shared phenomenological attitudes which underlie 
our apparently different values. This is a more objective account than other people's. For 
ǰȱ	ȱȱȇȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȃȱ
and cultural backgrounds. This means that critical relativism is just another name for the 
ȱ Ȅȱ ǻŗşşşǱȱ ŘŞŜǼǯȱ 	ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȇȱ
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃȱ Ȅȱ ȱ
ȃȱȄȱǻŗşşşǱȱşřǼǯȱȱȱes in part from the fact that I am 
focusing on values modes, which exist in and between all cultures, and these scholars are 
talking about the objectivity of certain values within particular cultures. We agree that 
Locke does not, and cannot, appeal to any standard outside of human beings' practices of 
valuation. 
14It would be easy to interpret Locke, given the time he was writing, as talking about the 
explicitly fascist movements of his time when he warns about absolutism. But this would 
miss the true force of his criticism. Locke is insistent that an ostensibly democratic society 
can be authoritarian in the way he is concerned about, if instead of recognising essential 
features of commonality between cultures, they insist on a conformity of democratic 
institutions. Cf. Locke (1942: 53ff). 
15 ȃȱȱ ȱȱno common character ȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱȱ Ȅȱ
(James, 1891, WB: 153, emphasis mine). 
16 See Stern and Williams (forthcoming) for more detail about this example. Lamberth 
(2014) has recently done an excellent job of elaborating what I take to be James's 
pluralistic meta-philosophy. 
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17 (James, 1907, P: 144; 1909, PU: 139) 
18 cf. (James, 1907, P: 133-142; 1909, PU: 141) 
19 Locke will agree that all opinions emerge in historical and cultural contexts, but deny 
that we should see them as results of experimentation. 
20 See, for instance, (James, 1879, EPh: 21). 
21 cf. James (1909, PU: 147). 
22 Exactly what counts as experience in religious inquiry is up for debate. See, for instance, 
recent debates between Klein (2015) and Misak (2015). 
23 Fraser (1999) indicates a third criticism, not made by Locke, but made through him. She 
suggests that the American pragmatism of Peirce, James, Dewey, and even Jane Addams, 
is too abstract and intellectualised, and that Locke's pragmatism is based on a concrete 
understanding on inequality, power, domination, and race relations (cf. Fraser 1999: 4-5). 
24 We might suspect that James himself is not the target of this criticism, but that Locke 
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